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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
SECURITY DEVICES
Joseph Dainow*
PLEDGE
Article 3152 of the Civil Code1 requires actual delivery to the
creditor as essential to the contract of pledge. One reason for this
requirement is to establish the intent of the parties. While there
are situations for which the law recognizes a valid pledge with-
out a physical delivery into the personal possession of the cred-
itor,2 it is unusual for a creditor to deny such delivery when the
object is actually in his personal possession. This was one of the
disputed issues in the case of Ducros v. Williams.3 After collect-
ing $3,000 on a life insurance policy of her son, the mother sued
his estate for a like sum as the indebtedness on a promissory
note. The widow pleaded in defense that the policy had been
taken out with the mother as beneficiary in order to secure the
note, and that the payment under the policy had extinguished
the debt of the note. The mother maintained that she did not
know of the presence of the policy in her locked armoire until
finding it after her son's death, and she explained that her son
must have placed it there without her knowledge. This was con-
tradicted by the evidence that the policy was taken out for the
exact sum of the loan, three days after the execution of the note,
that the mother was not dependent on the son, and that the policy
was in the mother's personal possession. Under these circum-
stances the court concluded that the parties intended, and that
there had been, a valid pledge, which placed this case within
one of the exceptions of the statute exempting the proceeds of
insurance policies from payment of debts, 4 thereby discharging
the indebtedness on the note.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Art. 3152, La. Civil Code of 1870: "It is essential to the contract of a
pledge that the creditor be put in possession of the thing given to him in
pledge, and consequently that actual delivery of it be made to him, unless
he has possession of it already by some other right."
2. E.g., delivery to a third person agreed on by parties (Art. 3162, La.
Civil Code of 1870); pledge of incorporeal right (La. Act 95 of 1938 [La. R.S.
(1950) 9:4321 et seq.]).
3. 217 La. 418, 46 So. 2d 612 (1950).
4. La. Act 189 of 1914, as amended by La: Act 155 of 1934, repealed and
replaced by the more recent statute, La. Act 195 of 1948, § 14.37 (La. R.S.
[1950] 22:647).
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